i struggle to even imagine the degree of suffering in haiti right now, and as the world turns its head to that region we all wonder, "why do these things happen?" i mean, haiti, new orleans, pakistan, china, all these natural disasters that leave people and communities devastated. some of the situations are obviously compounded by a pre-existing condition where resources are few, keeping the population vulnerable as it is. that is clear in haiti, and the argument has certainly been made for new orleans. in many ways, in a natural disaster what emerges as the most distressing thing is the human responsibility in it. because natural disasters happen, and they are tragic, but they are beyond our control. but the human element, the social element is what we control. if infrastructure wasnt so vulnerable and pathetically supported what sort of situation would we be looking at? if we could mobilize resources immediately to disaster areas rather than focusing our billions on war.
these natural events become disasters because of our human role. and we leave a scar on collective humanity when we acknowledge that we could have done something different.
and its this awareness that makes me return to the palestinian issue. it is not a humanitarian crisis because that would be the result of some natural disaster which would beg the assistance of the world. it is exclusively a human construction, and the ideology behind it is as vile as the science of the atomic bomb. brilliant minds put their efforts behind devising a plan that can only result in destruction and pain. minds that are fooling themselves if they believe that what they are doing is in the name of some objective science, for the benefit of all. this is a political situation, a human situation, and for that it seems to me all the more tragic. we have the ability to influence things here, yet we stand back and watch, let it happen, as if its as inevitable or uncontrollable as an earthquake or a tsunami.
Friday, January 15, 2010
cairo
The egyptian sun
feels warmer today
Softer
The streets quiet
lined with praying men
we bumble along to
the main square
and the prayer walks with us
I see the rail, cold
green, and my heart
is fragile again
I feel its heaviness
against my forearms
the sweat slippery
the elbow in my back
Today the sun warms it
its hard to fathom my
relationship with it yesterday
dirty fingernails, scared eyes
orders
but we were all penned up
they were young, I hold up my hands,
showed them my palms, it was safe
salaam, met their eyes
but they were in a cage too
So they grabbed old women
threw them
kicked heads, blood
So the rail today flashes
this thing, deep in my body
a memory. I realize that
I start to witness this day
differently, with a fractured heart
Impossibly this place
reminds me of my childhood
I know the songs, the rhythms, the cadence
of the soft face of the boy
bouncing on the donkey
What is the connection?
This fractured heart?
This fragrant wisp of childhood?
And its real, I know this place.
feels warmer today
Softer
The streets quiet
lined with praying men
we bumble along to
the main square
and the prayer walks with us
I see the rail, cold
green, and my heart
is fragile again
I feel its heaviness
against my forearms
the sweat slippery
the elbow in my back
Today the sun warms it
its hard to fathom my
relationship with it yesterday
dirty fingernails, scared eyes
orders
but we were all penned up
they were young, I hold up my hands,
showed them my palms, it was safe
salaam, met their eyes
but they were in a cage too
So they grabbed old women
threw them
kicked heads, blood
So the rail today flashes
this thing, deep in my body
a memory. I realize that
I start to witness this day
differently, with a fractured heart
Impossibly this place
reminds me of my childhood
I know the songs, the rhythms, the cadence
of the soft face of the boy
bouncing on the donkey
What is the connection?
This fractured heart?
This fragrant wisp of childhood?
And its real, I know this place.
a comment from a friend, thanks
i wanted to post the excellent thoughts of a friend who left a comment on my last blog entry, i thought i would post it here as to make sure that people read it (i am assuming its ok):
It is also worth pointing out that South Africans resisting apartheid sometimes used violent means; the ANC had an "armed wing" or militia as well, and they sometimes attacked civilian targets. And that does not make the struggle against apartheid any less justified or worthy of support. I think there is a tendency, at least in the US, to talk about South Africa as the "good" national liberation struggle that won international support because it used only nonviolent means--instead of pointing out that it won international support because the cause was just and the world woke up to the reality of what was going on.
The ANC had a theory of struggle called "four pillars of resistance." The four pillars were armed struggle, underground organizing, mass nonviolent protest action, and international solidarity. They saw all of these types of resistance as working together, with some being more or less important/useful at particular times depending on the context of the struggle. I think this is a really useful framework for thinking about Palestinian resistance as well. We have so much to learn from the South African struggle and most of us are just beginning to get our heads around how to apply those lessons.
It is also worth pointing out that South Africans resisting apartheid sometimes used violent means; the ANC had an "armed wing" or militia as well, and they sometimes attacked civilian targets. And that does not make the struggle against apartheid any less justified or worthy of support. I think there is a tendency, at least in the US, to talk about South Africa as the "good" national liberation struggle that won international support because it used only nonviolent means--instead of pointing out that it won international support because the cause was just and the world woke up to the reality of what was going on.
The ANC had a theory of struggle called "four pillars of resistance." The four pillars were armed struggle, underground organizing, mass nonviolent protest action, and international solidarity. They saw all of these types of resistance as working together, with some being more or less important/useful at particular times depending on the context of the struggle. I think this is a really useful framework for thinking about Palestinian resistance as well. We have so much to learn from the South African struggle and most of us are just beginning to get our heads around how to apply those lessons.
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
israeli apartheid
What is unclear about the mission and potential of a state that is founded on the principle of race, on the principle that all are obviously, historically, and legally not created equal and are not entitled to equal rights? Israel has made a case that race and religion are synonymous, and is inherently an exclusive state. I can't understand how any argument could exist that would suggest that the state of Israel is not inherently and by definition racist. I also can not understand how racism could ever be non-violent. Those two points together provide a very simple, clear case for how the state of Israel inherently engenders violence, and that violence is to be expected from such an entity. Its very nature allows for no other reality. No state that is by its nature at its creation exclusive, placing one group of people above another, can be anything other than violent. And it is just a matter of observing the reality of the Palestinians to see that the expectations have been fulfilled.
i feel like finally its being called for what it is. i read an article in haarezt about whether or not the "A" word is appropriate in describing the occupation. Someone wrote, opposing the use of the word, that you can't even begin to compare the situation with that of South Africa because of the nature of the resistance that both states shared. The author contends that because the nature of [some] of the Palestinian resistance to the occupation includes an armed component, then it is inherently different than that of the South African situation which employed only non-violent tactics or at least did not target civilians.
This argument is of course problematic, to say the least, but it is a very common approach used when supporting the Zionist state and its violence. First of all, the argument is a failure because it intersects the conflict at the point of the resistance, not at the point of the origin of the oppression, which is the root of the resistance. By carefully avoiding the root and focusing on the nature of the resistance it is easy to criticize. Second, the nature of the resistance has nothing to do with the nature of the oppression, which is where the parallels are drawn between Israeli and South African Apartheid. And we don't have to look very far to see that Israel was among the nations that supported the South African apartheid state.
Other thoughts:
I feel very tired of engaging in this conflict in a responsive way. It is demoralizing and devastating when we begin to engage once violence has begun. We can not wait for Israel to attack again, because we should know that our outrage and taking to the streets in protest does not halt a war once it has begun. We urgently need to be directly acting in a way that sends a message to our "leaders" that ignoring us is very problematic, to put it lightly. NOW is the time to be in the streets, before a war starts, because if we aren't getting out there now, we will only be useful to mourn the dead and wonder why this has happened. It is no longer my intention to intervene in this conflict many steps removed from the point of violence. Standing in front of an embassy or writing to my congressperson means that I am many steps removed from the violence that is about to befall Palestinian women, men, and children. Our intervention, at every level, must demand accountability. People must understand that complicity is violence. That is what Egypt was so intent upon avoiding - an awareness of their violent complicity in the siege. But now at least Egyptians know, and hopefully so does the rest of the world. But the others who are complicit are harder to pin down. It is harder to bring the light to the dark corners where politicians sit and make their decisions, far from the battlefields and dropping bombs. But its clear as day that they have the same responsibility in this as we ALL do.
i feel like finally its being called for what it is. i read an article in haarezt about whether or not the "A" word is appropriate in describing the occupation. Someone wrote, opposing the use of the word, that you can't even begin to compare the situation with that of South Africa because of the nature of the resistance that both states shared. The author contends that because the nature of [some] of the Palestinian resistance to the occupation includes an armed component, then it is inherently different than that of the South African situation which employed only non-violent tactics or at least did not target civilians.
This argument is of course problematic, to say the least, but it is a very common approach used when supporting the Zionist state and its violence. First of all, the argument is a failure because it intersects the conflict at the point of the resistance, not at the point of the origin of the oppression, which is the root of the resistance. By carefully avoiding the root and focusing on the nature of the resistance it is easy to criticize. Second, the nature of the resistance has nothing to do with the nature of the oppression, which is where the parallels are drawn between Israeli and South African Apartheid. And we don't have to look very far to see that Israel was among the nations that supported the South African apartheid state.
Other thoughts:
I feel very tired of engaging in this conflict in a responsive way. It is demoralizing and devastating when we begin to engage once violence has begun. We can not wait for Israel to attack again, because we should know that our outrage and taking to the streets in protest does not halt a war once it has begun. We urgently need to be directly acting in a way that sends a message to our "leaders" that ignoring us is very problematic, to put it lightly. NOW is the time to be in the streets, before a war starts, because if we aren't getting out there now, we will only be useful to mourn the dead and wonder why this has happened. It is no longer my intention to intervene in this conflict many steps removed from the point of violence. Standing in front of an embassy or writing to my congressperson means that I am many steps removed from the violence that is about to befall Palestinian women, men, and children. Our intervention, at every level, must demand accountability. People must understand that complicity is violence. That is what Egypt was so intent upon avoiding - an awareness of their violent complicity in the siege. But now at least Egyptians know, and hopefully so does the rest of the world. But the others who are complicit are harder to pin down. It is harder to bring the light to the dark corners where politicians sit and make their decisions, far from the battlefields and dropping bombs. But its clear as day that they have the same responsibility in this as we ALL do.
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
Monday, January 11, 2010
Some really bad news
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1141858.html
The looming war in Gaza: Can Obama stop it before it starts?
By Bradley Burston
Next week, or the week after, Barack Obama may well see intelligence reports of tank battalions moving south and west along Israeli highways, and whole infantry brigades setting up camp in the western Negev.
The countdown to the Second Gaza War has begun in earnest. Date it, if you like, to Sunday, and a coolly terrifying analysis by Yom Tov Samia, former overall Israeli military commander of the Gaza Strip and the adjacent Negev.
Or date it, if you prefer, according to the axiom of contemporary Israeli history which reads: A future war becomes all but inevitable the moment a key IDF reserve major general declares it so.
Alternatively, date it from the moment that selective amnesia allows Israeli political figures to court the illusion that Hamas can be invaded to death.
All this and more was to be had from an interview Samia gave Army Radio this week, which should give pause not only to the Palestinians and Israelis who may fall victim to a Second Gaza War, but to Washington as well.
If last year's brutal fighting is any indication - and there is every reason to believe that it is - a full-on drive to prevent the looming Israel-Hamas confrontation in the Strip belongs at the top tier of Obama's already staggering pile of priorities.
Another Gaza war, this one likely to be an even more bitter onslaught, could not only prove lethal to what is left of Israeli moral credibility, it could undermine and cripple Obama's military-political offensives in Iraq, Afghanistan and, slipping further down the slope, Yemen.
If Obama still nurses hopes of brokering a peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, his first task must be defusing the war wagon before it once again engulfs Gaza - and, this time around, Tel Aviv as well. As it is, war in Gaza has shifted Israel's political landscape, and not in Obama's favor.
The 2005 disengagement from Gaza, with its resultant rocket fire against the Negev and lack of any peace dividend, proved a huge blow to the Israeli left. But it was the Gaza offensive a year ago, a war supported at first even by Meretz, that was the end. It was the end of Meretz, the end of the Labor Party, the end of a leftist alliance with Israeli Arab parties.
Can Barak Obama stop the coming war in Gaza? Only if he acts fast. And only if his advisors study and apply with care lessons from the last war, in particular the period which immediately preceded it.
One logical place to start is another analysis, also broadcast by the IDF radio station, this one five days before the last war began. It was by Shmuel Zakai, a retired brigadier general who served under Samia and later commanded the IDF's Gaza Division.
Zakai urged a fundamental reappraisal of how Israelis should regard Hamas. At heart, "The State of Israel must understand that Hamas rule in Gaza is a fact, and it is with that government that we must reach a situation of calm."
Should he wholly adopt the peacemakers's role, Obama has resources and conditions which were unavailable a year ago.
It is, of course, no coincidence that what may prove a crucial test of the Obama administration coincides with the anniversary of his taking office. Cast Lead, pointedly launched at the interregnum between the outgoing Bush administration and the incoming Obama White House, ended with a unilateral Israeli case fire barely 48 hours before the president-elect took the oath of office.
At the time, a scandal-plagued, lethally unpopular prime minister desperate to redeem a reputation for military misjudgment that complemented his record of personal malfeasance, took advantage of a power vacuum in Washington to mount a war that failed to achieve any of its stated objectives, casting Israel, in the world's eye, as an unapologetic aggressor.
This time around, the Obama administration has a number of elements in its favor. One is the present predicament of Hamas, which has promised its constituents a prisoner release in exchange for captive IDF soldier Gilad Shalit and, having greatly raised expectations across the Palestinian territories, has yet to deliver. Hamas, ever-attuned to Palestinian public opinion, can also ill afford another devastating campaign in the ravaged Strip so soon after Cast Lead.
Another is a potentially proactive and newly constructive role on the part of Egypt, which until recently has sat largely passive, if apprehensive, on the sidelines. Analysts have said Egypt's huge iron wall project now underway along the border between Gaza and Egyptian Sinai sends a strong message to both Hamas and Israel.
With Samia hinting that in a new war the IDF might capture and occupy the tunnel-honeycombed Philadelphi Corridor which borders the new wall, Professor Yoram Meital of the Negev's Ben-Gurion University said this week that to Israel, "The message is that Egypt is setting out a border, and views any effort to touch it as an attack on its national security."
"To Hamas they are saying 'We will not under any circumstances lend our hand to the establishment of a mini-state in the Gaza Strip,' and are thus closing the Rafiah crossing nearly hermetically, and erecting the iron wall in the bowels of the earth.'"
One of the most important lessons of last year's bloodletting is that war or no war, Hamas and only Hamas decides when and if rockets are to be fired from Gaza into Israel. Rockets flew throughout the three-week war, and stopped only at Hamas' order, several hours after Israel stilled its guns.
The mayor of rocket-scarred Sderot, David Buskila, said this week that, "By the close of Operation Cast Lead, we understood that the military solution cannot be a comprehensive one, it's a solution that can create breaks between escalations."
In the end, Israel holds perhaps the most significant card to play, a move which may depend on a uncharacteristically hands-on Obama White House. With third-party international mediation, Israel could offer to resurrect the 2008 truce by significantly alleviating its stranglehold embargo on the Strip.
To decide to do that, however, Israel would also have to abandon its longtime belief in firepower as a lever to bend Gaza to its will. And that means abandoning reasoning that goes precisely like this:
Samia: "The State of Israel is not doing this to replace the regime in Gaza. The State of Israel is doing this because [of] a situation in which Hamas controls the Gaza Strip and the basis of its world view is to annihilate the State of Israel and to fire on schools and kindergartens and to carry out terror attacks in restaurants.
"For the State of Israel, it doesn't matter if Hamas calls itself a regime or a just a terror organization it's a terrorist organization in every way, and we must deal with it and annihilate it.
"If, at the same opportunity, the moderates rise and come to power, that's good enough for us, we'll be pleased."
The looming war in Gaza: Can Obama stop it before it starts?
By Bradley Burston
Next week, or the week after, Barack Obama may well see intelligence reports of tank battalions moving south and west along Israeli highways, and whole infantry brigades setting up camp in the western Negev.
The countdown to the Second Gaza War has begun in earnest. Date it, if you like, to Sunday, and a coolly terrifying analysis by Yom Tov Samia, former overall Israeli military commander of the Gaza Strip and the adjacent Negev.
Or date it, if you prefer, according to the axiom of contemporary Israeli history which reads: A future war becomes all but inevitable the moment a key IDF reserve major general declares it so.
Alternatively, date it from the moment that selective amnesia allows Israeli political figures to court the illusion that Hamas can be invaded to death.
All this and more was to be had from an interview Samia gave Army Radio this week, which should give pause not only to the Palestinians and Israelis who may fall victim to a Second Gaza War, but to Washington as well.
If last year's brutal fighting is any indication - and there is every reason to believe that it is - a full-on drive to prevent the looming Israel-Hamas confrontation in the Strip belongs at the top tier of Obama's already staggering pile of priorities.
Another Gaza war, this one likely to be an even more bitter onslaught, could not only prove lethal to what is left of Israeli moral credibility, it could undermine and cripple Obama's military-political offensives in Iraq, Afghanistan and, slipping further down the slope, Yemen.
If Obama still nurses hopes of brokering a peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, his first task must be defusing the war wagon before it once again engulfs Gaza - and, this time around, Tel Aviv as well. As it is, war in Gaza has shifted Israel's political landscape, and not in Obama's favor.
The 2005 disengagement from Gaza, with its resultant rocket fire against the Negev and lack of any peace dividend, proved a huge blow to the Israeli left. But it was the Gaza offensive a year ago, a war supported at first even by Meretz, that was the end. It was the end of Meretz, the end of the Labor Party, the end of a leftist alliance with Israeli Arab parties.
Can Barak Obama stop the coming war in Gaza? Only if he acts fast. And only if his advisors study and apply with care lessons from the last war, in particular the period which immediately preceded it.
One logical place to start is another analysis, also broadcast by the IDF radio station, this one five days before the last war began. It was by Shmuel Zakai, a retired brigadier general who served under Samia and later commanded the IDF's Gaza Division.
Zakai urged a fundamental reappraisal of how Israelis should regard Hamas. At heart, "The State of Israel must understand that Hamas rule in Gaza is a fact, and it is with that government that we must reach a situation of calm."
Should he wholly adopt the peacemakers's role, Obama has resources and conditions which were unavailable a year ago.
It is, of course, no coincidence that what may prove a crucial test of the Obama administration coincides with the anniversary of his taking office. Cast Lead, pointedly launched at the interregnum between the outgoing Bush administration and the incoming Obama White House, ended with a unilateral Israeli case fire barely 48 hours before the president-elect took the oath of office.
At the time, a scandal-plagued, lethally unpopular prime minister desperate to redeem a reputation for military misjudgment that complemented his record of personal malfeasance, took advantage of a power vacuum in Washington to mount a war that failed to achieve any of its stated objectives, casting Israel, in the world's eye, as an unapologetic aggressor.
This time around, the Obama administration has a number of elements in its favor. One is the present predicament of Hamas, which has promised its constituents a prisoner release in exchange for captive IDF soldier Gilad Shalit and, having greatly raised expectations across the Palestinian territories, has yet to deliver. Hamas, ever-attuned to Palestinian public opinion, can also ill afford another devastating campaign in the ravaged Strip so soon after Cast Lead.
Another is a potentially proactive and newly constructive role on the part of Egypt, which until recently has sat largely passive, if apprehensive, on the sidelines. Analysts have said Egypt's huge iron wall project now underway along the border between Gaza and Egyptian Sinai sends a strong message to both Hamas and Israel.
With Samia hinting that in a new war the IDF might capture and occupy the tunnel-honeycombed Philadelphi Corridor which borders the new wall, Professor Yoram Meital of the Negev's Ben-Gurion University said this week that to Israel, "The message is that Egypt is setting out a border, and views any effort to touch it as an attack on its national security."
"To Hamas they are saying 'We will not under any circumstances lend our hand to the establishment of a mini-state in the Gaza Strip,' and are thus closing the Rafiah crossing nearly hermetically, and erecting the iron wall in the bowels of the earth.'"
One of the most important lessons of last year's bloodletting is that war or no war, Hamas and only Hamas decides when and if rockets are to be fired from Gaza into Israel. Rockets flew throughout the three-week war, and stopped only at Hamas' order, several hours after Israel stilled its guns.
The mayor of rocket-scarred Sderot, David Buskila, said this week that, "By the close of Operation Cast Lead, we understood that the military solution cannot be a comprehensive one, it's a solution that can create breaks between escalations."
In the end, Israel holds perhaps the most significant card to play, a move which may depend on a uncharacteristically hands-on Obama White House. With third-party international mediation, Israel could offer to resurrect the 2008 truce by significantly alleviating its stranglehold embargo on the Strip.
To decide to do that, however, Israel would also have to abandon its longtime belief in firepower as a lever to bend Gaza to its will. And that means abandoning reasoning that goes precisely like this:
Samia: "The State of Israel is not doing this to replace the regime in Gaza. The State of Israel is doing this because [of] a situation in which Hamas controls the Gaza Strip and the basis of its world view is to annihilate the State of Israel and to fire on schools and kindergartens and to carry out terror attacks in restaurants.
"For the State of Israel, it doesn't matter if Hamas calls itself a regime or a just a terror organization it's a terrorist organization in every way, and we must deal with it and annihilate it.
"If, at the same opportunity, the moderates rise and come to power, that's good enough for us, we'll be pleased."
DENIED
Well, there's some discouraging news. First, after the Viva Palestina convoy protests it seems that the Egyptian government has had enough with internationals trying to get into Gaza and exposing them for the criminals that they are. So they officially have closed the border, using very firm language, to all international convoys. From now on, they say, no one will get in through Rafah, but rather must go through the Egyptian Red Crescent in order to get in humanitarian aid. No word about individuals, but it certainly seemed that their stance was getting more and more rigid.
The following day, yesterday, we were notified by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry that our entry permissions were officially denied. It is unclear if that means that in the future we have all been blacklisted because of our association with the GFM or what, but it does mean that for now my official channels have been completely denied. In the past it seems that there was a disconnect between the border and Cairo decisions, and that people have just gone to the border, knocked, waited, but often gotten in, without official permission from Cairo. But now we are not sure, and it seems that there is more coordination and a very hard line. In fact it will probably be very difficult for me to even reach the border before being stopped and turned back at a military checkpoint. Many internationals have tried and are most have been returned. To my knowledge, only one person from the GFM has been successful in getting in, an Indian man, who had the support of his Embassy to pressure the Egyptian government. Obviously I don't have that support.
So now faced with this reality I am not entirely certain what my next steps may be. I have played with the ideas of trying to get to the border and wait, and hope. I have thought about going back to the states. I have thought about going back to the states earlier than I had planned. I have thought about going to the West Bank and trying to finish the work that has been started there, so I have initiated phone calls to see if people are still interested and/or have the time.
One thing that is clear is that we all now realize that Egypt is a huge pressure point in effecting change in this issue, and is considered a domino in the region for democracy, one thing that both Israel and the US, in actuality, FEAR rather than promote.
In the past two days I have been involved in drafting proposals for how to create a transparent, democratic, and participatory process for making decisions around the Cairo Declaration Movement. The premise is that there are seven points for implementation, and we are assuming that SOME sort of structure is necessary, not for an organization, per se, but for consultation and decision-making. What we have developed is a proposal for a type of "straw poll" or referendum process carried out over the internet that will ideally be used to consult all signatories of the Declaration and get feedback that will inform direction and policy in the movement. It is actually quite exciting, I have never heard of an international effort, on such a large scale, that has attempted such a democratic and truly participatory process. I hope that it can be implemented, useful, and potentially serve as a model for other movements. We'll see! But that is where I have been focusing my efforts in the past few days. Lots of meetings, lots of writing and thinking and sitting around and drinking tea.
FYI: there has been a call for action on the 16th or 17th (either day) of January to protest Israeli embassies all over the world. It is also a day where people are being encouraged to banner and leaflet and educate around the Cairo Declaration. Let's get the ball rolling!
For now, I really don't know what my plans are. I feel like I am so close to the region to not be involved, but I am trying to get clarity about whether its the right time or not, for me. I have given myself a few days, maybe this week, to try to make that decision, because I am still productive here in these meetings and such. When I cease to be productive here I have a feeling that my opinion about staying will change significantly. Also, it seems clear that I am going to be putting most of my energy behind implementing the Cairo Declaration, so that might actually mean that I need to go back to the States anyway. We'll see.
The following day, yesterday, we were notified by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry that our entry permissions were officially denied. It is unclear if that means that in the future we have all been blacklisted because of our association with the GFM or what, but it does mean that for now my official channels have been completely denied. In the past it seems that there was a disconnect between the border and Cairo decisions, and that people have just gone to the border, knocked, waited, but often gotten in, without official permission from Cairo. But now we are not sure, and it seems that there is more coordination and a very hard line. In fact it will probably be very difficult for me to even reach the border before being stopped and turned back at a military checkpoint. Many internationals have tried and are most have been returned. To my knowledge, only one person from the GFM has been successful in getting in, an Indian man, who had the support of his Embassy to pressure the Egyptian government. Obviously I don't have that support.
So now faced with this reality I am not entirely certain what my next steps may be. I have played with the ideas of trying to get to the border and wait, and hope. I have thought about going back to the states. I have thought about going back to the states earlier than I had planned. I have thought about going to the West Bank and trying to finish the work that has been started there, so I have initiated phone calls to see if people are still interested and/or have the time.
One thing that is clear is that we all now realize that Egypt is a huge pressure point in effecting change in this issue, and is considered a domino in the region for democracy, one thing that both Israel and the US, in actuality, FEAR rather than promote.
In the past two days I have been involved in drafting proposals for how to create a transparent, democratic, and participatory process for making decisions around the Cairo Declaration Movement. The premise is that there are seven points for implementation, and we are assuming that SOME sort of structure is necessary, not for an organization, per se, but for consultation and decision-making. What we have developed is a proposal for a type of "straw poll" or referendum process carried out over the internet that will ideally be used to consult all signatories of the Declaration and get feedback that will inform direction and policy in the movement. It is actually quite exciting, I have never heard of an international effort, on such a large scale, that has attempted such a democratic and truly participatory process. I hope that it can be implemented, useful, and potentially serve as a model for other movements. We'll see! But that is where I have been focusing my efforts in the past few days. Lots of meetings, lots of writing and thinking and sitting around and drinking tea.
FYI: there has been a call for action on the 16th or 17th (either day) of January to protest Israeli embassies all over the world. It is also a day where people are being encouraged to banner and leaflet and educate around the Cairo Declaration. Let's get the ball rolling!
For now, I really don't know what my plans are. I feel like I am so close to the region to not be involved, but I am trying to get clarity about whether its the right time or not, for me. I have given myself a few days, maybe this week, to try to make that decision, because I am still productive here in these meetings and such. When I cease to be productive here I have a feeling that my opinion about staying will change significantly. Also, it seems clear that I am going to be putting most of my energy behind implementing the Cairo Declaration, so that might actually mean that I need to go back to the States anyway. We'll see.
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